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THE NAME GAME: CYBERSQUATTING AND 
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT ON SOCIAL 
MEDIA WEBSITES 
Thomas J. Curtin 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, Internet use has grown astronomically,1 
allowing Internet users to have increased control over web page 
creation, and permitting Internet users to create unique profiles for 
social networking.2 With such growth and evolution, the Internet 
has also become a dangerous venue where individuals hijack 
domain names and profit off the damage caused to a brand name. 
For example, were an Internet user to accidentally type 
“Citybank.org,” instead of “Citibank.org,”  into his browser to 
perform online banking activities, he would stumble upon a 
website with misleading Citibank advertisements that would 
                                                          
 J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2011; B.A., Fordham University, 2008.  
I would like to thank my friends and family for their support during the writing 
process.  I would also like to thank Professor Bambauer for his guidance on this 
topic.   
1 See Internet Growth Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm (last updated July 30, 2010) 
(showing that in 1995, only 16 million users browsed the Internet, while in 
2010, that number skyrocketed to 1.65 billion users).  
2 See Maria Markella, The Web 2.0 Phenomenon: Another Trend?, 
BUZZLE.COM, http://www.buzzle.com/articles/web-20-phenomenon-another-
internet-trend.html (noting that the movement is characterized by websites, such 
as Myspace, which allow “users to take active part in the development of a 
webpage’s content and history . . . .”); see also Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0, 
O’REILLY MEDIA (Sept. 30, 2005), http://oreilly.com/pub/a/web2/archive/what-
is-web-20.html?page=1 (discussing how the burst of the dot com bubble in the 
earlier part of the decade gave rise to a phenomenon known as Web 2.0, which 
makes software much more accessible to browsers). 
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redirect him to competitors’ websites.3 The resulting frustration in 
being redirected to the wrong website would be directed in part 
toward Citibank and its goodwill.4 Such diversions, as in the 
Citigroup example, are not accidents; rather, they are scams 
intended to bring Internet users to competitors’ sites so that the 
domain name owners make a profit off of the Internet user’s 
mistake.  
This process, known as cybersquatting, is a form of trademark 
infringement.5  Cybersquatting involves the bad faith registration 
of “well-known brand names as Internet domain names in order to 
force the rightful owners of the marks to pay for the right to 
engage in electronic commerce under [their own trademark].”6 
Cybersquatters hurry to a domain registration site to register a 
domain name similar to another company’s trademark before that 
company has had the chance to protect and fully use its trademark.7 
To cite one example, an impostor registered the domain name 
“attphonecard.com” and established a website that solicited credit 
card information from Internet users.8 In this case, the Internet user 
wonders why he stumbled on an unrelated website, which he did 
not intend to visit, and which then fraudulently obtained his 
financial information. The abusive registration of this domain 
name harmed the AT&T brand and the consumer’s frustration 
resulting from this scam likely was directed at AT&T and its 
mark.9 Such abusive registration of domain names confuses the 
consumer and allows the infringer to profit off of his misconduct.10   
                                                          
3 Citigroup, Inc. v. Chen Bao Shui, 611 F. Supp. 2d 507, 511 (E.D. Va. 
2009). 
4 See id.  Indeed, the court in Citigroup noted that the defendant reserved 
this domain name solely to garner click through revenue.  Id. 
5 See Virtual Works Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 267 
(4th Cir. 2001) (describing how cybersquatting is the “Internet version of a land 
grab”).   
6 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999)). 
7 Id. at 267. 
8 Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name 
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, S. REP. NO. 
106-140, 106th Cong. 8 (1999) (statement of Anne H. Chasser, President, Int’l 
Trademark Ass’n). 
9 See id. 
10 Hamptons Locations, Inc. v. Rubens, 640 F. Supp. 2d 208, 218 
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Trademark infringement on the Internet is not merely confined 
to squatting on a domain name; courts have also held that 
trademark infringement includes abusively reserving “metatags”11 
similar to famous brands on search engines such as Google.12 In 
this form of infringement, the impostor13 uses famous brand names 
as hidden text in the website, which, in turn, creates search words 
on search engines to lead the consumer to an impostor website.14 
These metatags are a form of infringement because, if used in an 
abusive manner, they act as a mechanism to traffic Internet users to 
an impostor website.15 
On June 13, 2009, Facebook,16 a social media site boasting 500 
million active members,17 unveiled a new username feature that 
allowed its users to create distinct web addresses, or “vanity 
                                                          
(E.D.N.Y. 2009).  
11 “Metatags are HTML code intended to describe the contents of the web 
site . . . . The more often a term appears in the metatags and in the text of the 
web page, the more likely it is that the web page will be “hit” in a search for that 
keyword and the higher on the list of “hits” the web page will appear.” 
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
12 See Promatek Indus. Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir. 
2002) (“Consumers who are directed to Equitrac’s webpage [as a result of the 
infringing metatag] are likely to learn more about Equitrac and its products before 
beginning a new search for Promatek and Copitrak.”);  see generally THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:69 
(4th ed. 2010) (describing how the Lanham Act applies to metatags). 
13 For the purposes of this Note, “impostor” will refer generally to 
cybersquatters. 
14 See, e.g., Aztar Corp. v. MGM Casino, No. 00-833-A, 2001 WL 939070, 
at *5 (E.D. Va. 2001) (describing how defendant used Tropicana as a metatag to 
traffic browsers to his infringing website, “tropicanacasino.com”). 
15 Id.; Kraft Food Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (N.D. 
Ill. 2002) (noting how defendant used “VelVeeda” as a metatag to direct 
browsers to a pornographic website entitled “cheesygraphics.com”).  
16 Facebook is the most popular social media website, and allows 
individuals to create profiles, add friends, and join networks organized by 
school, workplace, or location. Josie Myers, What is Facebook?, WISEGEEK, 
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-facebook.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2010). 
17 Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2010). 
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URLs,”18 for their profiles.19 On the one hand, the feature is 
beneficial in that it allows users to express themselves and makes it 
easier for other users to connect with them.20 In addition, the 
vanity URL cuts search costs by allowing individuals to use their 
names and allowing companies to use their brands as usernames.21 
On the other hand, the feature also makes it easier to hijack a 
trademark by allowing impostors to reserve a brand name as their 
usernames.   
Before Facebook launched its username feature, users on other 
social media sites, such as Twitter22 and Myspace,23 abused the 
username feature and reserved others’ names to pose as celebrities; 
users also created impostor profiles that maligned the celebrities’ 
character.24 For example, on Twitter, impostors posed as well-
                                                          
18 The username functions as a “vanity URL” because the reservation of the 
username changes the URL from a numerical identification number to the 
individual’s or corporation’s name. See Peter T. Wakiyama & Odia Kagan, 
Facebook Vanity URLs May Hurt More Than Just One’s Pride, 21 NO. 9. 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 7 (2009) (“On June 13, 2009, Facebook vanity 
URLs opened for registration by its users. Instead of 
www.facebook.com/id=591932074, a user’s page would now be located at 
www.facebook.com/johndoe, allowing the user to be easily found by entering his 
or her name into the URL in the browser.”). 
19 See Blaise DiPersia, Coming Soon: Facebook Usernames, THE 
FACEBOOK BLOG (June 9, 2009, 12:11PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php? 
post=90316352130 (highlighting the usefulness of the Facebook username 
feature). 
20 Id.  
21 See id. 
22 Twitter is a social media website that enables users to post thoughts and 
messages as “tweets,” and allows individuals to follow others’ tweets.  About 
Twitter, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Sept. 13, 2010). 
Additionally, the website allows individuals to group tweets together using 
“hashtags,” which appears in search engine results, including on Twitter’s home 
page. TECH FOR LUDDITES (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.techforluddites.com/ 
2009/02/the-twitter-hash-tag-what-is-it-and-how-do-you-use-it.html.   
23 MySpace enables individuals to create unique profiles, add friends, and 
send messages, thereby empowering “its global community to experience the 
Internet through a social lens by integrating personal profiles, photos, videos, 
mobile, messaging, games, and the world’s largest music community.” MySpace 
Press Room, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/pressroom (last visited Sept. 
13, 2010). 
24 See Douglas MacMillan, LaRussa v. Twitter Tests Web Anonymity, 
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known figures such as the Dalai Lama and Kanye West.25 Needless 
to say, celebrities were not pleased with these impersonations.26 In 
one recent illustration of this problem, an anonymous user created 
an impostor account for BP, titled “BPGlobalPR,” mocking the 
company for its handling of the oil spill.27 The mock account was 
followed by almost 145,000 people, and the fake profile garnered 
significant media attention.28 In response to BP’s complaints about 
the mock account, Twitter coerced the operator of the profile to 
post a disclaimer.29 However, a response like Twitter’s may only 
go so far; as the population of social media sites has grown 
exponentially, efforts to control this problem and enforce 
trademark policies have been increasingly futile. 
On June 5, 2009, Tony La Russa, the manager of the St. Louis 
Cardinals, filed a complaint against Twitter, accusing Twitter of 
cybersquatting.30 The dispute centered on a Twitter profile that 
used La Russa’s name, had a picture of La Russa, and had a 
headline that said “Hey there! Tony La Russa is now using 
                                                          
BUSINESSWEEK (June 10, 2009, 12:01 AM EST), http://www.businessweek.com 
/technology/content/jun2009/tc2009069_767898.htm.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. See also Big Tent Democrat, Obama, URLs, Domain Names, 
Cybersquatting and The First Amendment, TALKLEFT.COM (May 2, 2007, 3:20 
PM), http://www.talkleft.com/story/2007/5/2/161947/9512 (noting that President 
Obama complained about an unofficial MySpace profile entitled “Friends of 
Obama,” which MySpace later transferred to his campaign). 
27 Brian Stelter, BP Account on Twitter? Just a Joke; K thx bye, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/us/10twitter.html. 
See also Maria Newman, BlogTalk: Twitter and the G.O.P., THE CAUCUS (Oct. 
22, 2009, 2:49 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/blogtalk-
twitter-and-the-gop/ (discussing how Republican operatives created fake profiles 
with names like “MeetRepDonovan” and “MeetRepUrban”). Twitter shut down 
the account because the impersonation was intended to deceive voters and it 
confused voters, despite the disclaimer that the profile was sponsored by the 
state’s Republican Party. Id. 
28 Stelter, supra note 27.  
29 Id.. Twitter’s policy allows users to pose as celebrities as long as they 
disclaim that the page is merely an impersonation and not intended to deceive 
anyone.  See id. 
30 See Complaint at 2, La Russa v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC-09-488101, 2009 
WL 1569936 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 6, 2009) [hereinafter Complaint, La Russa]. 
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Twitter.”31 The profile encouraged users to “[j]oin today to start 
receiving Tony La Russa’s updates.”32 Unfortunately for the users 
who followed these tweets, the status updates were vulgar and 
derogatory.33 La Russa argued that the author of the profile 
intended, in bad faith, to divert Internet traffic away from La 
Russa’s website and make a profit from the injury to La Russa’s 
mark.34 La Russa’s case is the first of its kind, as no one has 
previously sued a social network site for cybersquatting.35 
La Russa v. Twitter, Inc. brings to the fore the issue of users 
reserving usernames and abusively using “hashtags”36 that infringe 
upon famous brands. This Note argues that the username features 
on social networking sites have opened the door for a new form of 
cybersquatting and trademark infringement, one which extends 
beyond the infringement of personal names.37 The vanity URLs 
and hashtags afford impostors with the opportunity to reserve 
famous brands as usernames and allow the impostor to use brands 
in hashtags to deceptively lure unsuspecting Internet users to an 
                                                          
31 Mark Milian, Cardinals Manager Tony La Russa Sues Twitter for 
Imposter Account, L.A. TIMES BLOG (June 4, 2009, 12:27 PM), http://latimes 
blogs.latimes.com/technology/2009/06/tony-la-russa-twitter.html.  
32 Complaint, La Russa, supra note 30, at 3. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 4. 
35 See Macmillan, supra note 24.  However, La Russa v. Twitter is not the 
first social media cybersquatting case; rather, the first case was Thompson v. 
Clean Flicks Media, in which a company sued an individual for reserving a 
MySpace username in bad faith. See Steven Seidenberg, Name’s Sake: Social 
Media Pose Trademark Threats for Companies, INSIDE COUNSEL (Sept. 1, 
2009), http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2009/September-2009/Pages/ 
Names-Sake.aspx. 
36 A hashtag is a form of metatag, typically preceded by the “#” symbol, 
which allows users to categorize their tweets.  What are Hashtags?, TWITTER 
HELP CENTER, http://support.twitter.com/entries/49309-what-are-hashtags-
symbols (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). By categorizing their tweets, the hashtags 
allow tweets to show up in search engines.  See id. 
37 Unlike other recent scholarly articles, the focus of this Note will be 
solely on username infringement of famous trademarks and brand names.  See, 
e.g., Zorik Pesochinsky, Almost Famous: Preventing Username Squatting on 
Social Networking Websites, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J., 223, 224–25 
(2010) (discussing the implications of username infringement on personal 
names). 
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infringing profile. Such abusive registrations allow the impostor to 
make a profit off of the injury of a trademark and damage the 
reputation of a famous brand name.   
However, the enforcement of trademark rights on social media 
websites could have a chilling effect on free speech rights and 
expose social media websites to frivolous lawsuits.  Thus, 
enforcement must be limited. This Note maintains that both 
Twitter and Facebook need to expand their policies to include 
username infringement and hashtag infringement, and that 
Congress needs to amend the scope of the Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) to address many of the 
complex issues associated with trademark infringement on social 
media websites.   
 Part I of this Note will discuss the concept of cybersquatting 
and examine the ACPA.38 Part II of this Note will explore the 
username features on Facebook and Twitter, illustrate the potential 
hazards that these features pose to the proprietary interests of 
trademark owners, and discuss whether the ACPA is applicable in 
the social networking arena. Part III will analyze the consequences 
of enforcing trademark rights on social media websites, 
specifically addressing free speech interests and contributory 
infringement. Finally,  Part IV will propose legislative solutions to 
the problems associated with cybersquatting on social media 
websites.   
I. THE CONCEPT OF CYBERSQUATTING AND ITS STATUTORY 
REMEDY 
The pervasiveness of the Internet in everyday transactions has 
                                                          
38 This Note will discuss the implications of the ACPA in the social 
networking arena, rather than focusing on the Uniform Domain Resolution 
Policy adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
See INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, UNIFORM DOMAIN 
RESOLUTION POLICY (1999), available at http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-
policy-24oct99.htms. Since the Uniform Domain Resolution Policy only focuses 
on second-level domain name infringement, and is not nearly as potent of a 
remedy as the ACPA (because its effects can merely be avoided by suing in 
federal court), it is not as relevant in this venue. See Seindenberg, supra note 35. 
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inevitably led to infringement of intellectual property.39 The 
amount of Internet transactions has increased dramatically over the 
past decade, and companies have taken advantage of this venue by 
advertising and selling their products on the Internet.40 With so 
many people browsing the Internet every day, it has become 
profitable for impostors to divert Internet users from their intended 
destinations thus diverting some of the business those users 
generate. These impostors rushed to register domain names that 
were remarkably similar to trademarks of corporations and, in 
doing so, left trademark owners powerless to protect their marks 
and register related domain names.41 In response to this practice, 
Congress took steps to give trademark owners protection rights on 
the Internet by enacting the ACPA in 1999.42 The statute gives 
trademark owners the power to seize domain names that are 
confusingly similar to their marks.43   
A. The Concept of Cybersquatting 
There are many economic incentives for actors to engage in 
cybersquatting, but this practice often comes at the expense of 
trademark owners. The cybersquatter is typically able to divert the 
Internet user to the websites of a company’s competitors.44 These 
competitors pay the cybersquatter for each hit that they get on their 
websites.45 In addition, because the trademark owner is unable to 
take advantage of his brand name, he is essentially forced to pay 
for the right to use his own brand name on the Internet46 because 
the cybersquatter typically charges a fee to the trademark owner to 
                                                          
39 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 6 (1999). 
40 Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d 
Cir. 2000) 
41 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 6–7. 
42 See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §25:78. 
43 See id. 
44 Id. §25:77. 
45 See Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 752, 765 (N.D. 
Ill. 2008). 
46 See Sporty’s Farm L.L.C., 202 F.3d at 493 (noting that mark owners are 
often “willing to pay ‘ransom’ in order to get ‘their names’ back”) (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 106-412, at 5–7; S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4–7 (1999)).   
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transfer the domain name.47 
The process by which a cybersquatter harms the proprietary 
interests of trademark owners is important to understand.48 The 
registration of a domain name similar to a brand name prevents the 
trademark owner from using his brand name in e-commerce 
because registration is done on a first come, first served basis.49 By 
registering a domain name that is substantially similar to the 
owner’s trademark, the cybersquatter precludes that owner from 
being able to use his brand name, which he likely spent a 
considerable amount of time building.50 Thus, the trademark owner 
is unable to fully take advantage of his own brand name, which 
may result in a loss of potential profits.51 In addition, the 
registration of a website and reservation of relevant search terms 
prevent a trademark owner from having full control over his brand 
name and its reputation.52 By diverting the Internet user away from 
his intended destination, the Internet user can become confused 
and unsure of whether the website is legitimate.53 Finally, the use 
of a mark in a domain name could essentially make a term generic, 
which would leave the term without any protection.54 
B. The Statutory Remedy to Cybersquatting 
With the proliferation of Internet transactions in the 1990s and 
into the twenty-first century, cybersquatting became a widespread 
practice and trademark owners were left without a remedy to such 
                                                          
47 See id. (“Cybersquatting involves the registration [of] domain names . . . 
by non-trademark holders who then try to sell the names back to the trademark 
owners.”). 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
50 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 7.  
51 See id. at 6. 
52 See id. 
53 Id. 
54 See Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, The Search Engine 
Advertising Market: Lucrative Space or Trademark Liability?, 17 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 223, 244–45 (2009) (“It is this same ability to convey meaning that 
underlies the great irony of trademark law—that too much success can bring 
ruin through genericide.”). 
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trademark infringement.55 In response to this problem, Congress 
passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in 1999.56 
The ACPA served as an extension of the Lanham Act to protect 
trademark owners from infringement on the Internet by providing a 
trademark infringement cause of action for cases of cybersquatting. 
The statute applies only to top level domain names.57 This new 
cause of action gives trademark owners an alternative to paying 
fees to cybersquatters to transfer domain names to the rightful 
owner and gives trademark owners the ability to enforce their 
rights on the Internet.58 
Under an ordinary trademark infringement claim, a trademark 
must be sufficiently distinctive or have acquired distinctiveness.59 
The ACPA incorporated the distinctiveness requirement of 
trademark law,60 but added some additional requirements. In order 
to succeed on a cybersquatting claim, the plaintiff must 
                                                          
55 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:77. 
56 Id. § 25:78. 
57 See Hamptons Locations, Inc. v. Rubens, 640 F. Supp. 2d 208, 213 
(E.D.N.Y 2009) (quoting Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 
F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000)) (“[ACPA] ‘was passed to protect consumers and 
American businesses, to promote the growth of online commerce, and to provide 
clarity in the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive 
registration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names with the intent to 
profit from the goodwill associated with such marks . . . .’”). ACPA defines a 
“domain name” as “any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or 
assigned by any domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain 
name registration authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet.” 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 2006). 
As discussed later in this section, this could prove to be problematic for features 
such as hashtags. See infra Part IV.A. 
58 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78.  
59 A trademark that is arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive is inherently 
distinctive.  See generally Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 
F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1974).  A descriptive term could be afforded the same protection 
as inherently distinctive marks if it obtains secondary meaning, in which the 
word is known by the public as specifically designating a particular product.  
See Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smoke House, 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(noting that the term “FISH FRI” did obtain secondary meaning). 
60 See, e.g., Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. Venetiangold.com, 380 F. 
Supp. 2d 737, 741–42 (E.D. Va. 2005) (discussing the ACPA’s requirement for 
distinctiveness of a mark). 
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demonstrate that the defendant registered or trafficked in a domain 
name that is (1) confusingly similar to plaintiff’s mark and (2) that 
the defendant “had a bad faith intent to profit from the mark.”61 
The plaintiff’s mark must be distinctive at the time of the 
registration of the domain name.62 Upon satisfying both criteria, 
the plaintiff is entitled to an in rem action consisting of the 
cancellation or transfer of the domain name to the rightful owner.63 
1. The Likelihood of Confusion 
In order to state a successful cybersquatting claim, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the infringing domain name is confusingly 
similar to or dilutive of the plaintiff’s mark.64 In cybersquatting 
cases, confusingly similar means that the plaintiff’s mark and the 
defendant’s domain name are so similar “in sight, sound or 
meaning that they could be confused.”65 Courts analyze the 
likelihood of confusion in Internet cases using a two-step analysis; 
they consider (1) whether the marks are substantially similar and 
(2) the proximity of the goods and services.66 The test, however, 
could end with the first step if the marks are identical or nearly 
identical.67  
                                                          
61 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1125(d)(1)(A) (West 2006). 
62 Id. §1125(d)(2)(A). 
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
65 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78. Courts do not solely consider the 
similarity between domain names; rather courts also consider the similarity 
between the domain name and the plaintiff’s trademark. Id. 
66 See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 
2000). In GoTo.com, the court stated that in the Internet context, a likelihood of 
confusion analysis should entail an examination of (1) the similarity of the 
marks, (2) the proximity of the goods and services, and (3) the simultaneous use 
of the Web as a marketing channel. Id. This test is simpler than the seven factor 
tests employed in “standard” likelihood of confusion cases. See, e.g., Polaroid 
Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 497 (2d Cir. 1961). In GoTo.com, 
the court’s third factor is rather redundant because, as the court admits, the two 
marks will likely be seen on the same screen. See GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1207. 
Therefore, this Note will not address the third factor. 
67 See, e.g., Texas Int’l. Prop. Assoc. v. Hoerbiger Holding AG, 624 F. 
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Courts generally treat domain names that are substantially 
similar to a trademark as confusingly similar and thereby create a 
presumption of confusion.68 A similarity in the appearance or 
sound of a mark could confuse consumers and this is relevant to 
the likelihood of confusion analysis.69 For example, in Texas 
International Property Associates v. Hoerbiger Holding AG, the 
court held that the Texas International Property Association’s 
“horbiger.com” was confusingly similar to Hoerbiger’s mark 
because the domain name had nearly identical spelling to the 
Hoerbiger mark.70  Likewise, in People for Ethical Treatment of 
Animals v. Doughney, the court maintained that defendant’s 
domain name, “PETA.org,” was a direct copy of plaintiff’s mark 
and thus created a presumption of confusion on the part of Internet 
user.71 In both cases, the courts held that a substantial similarity 
between a domain name and a trademark creates the presumption 
of confusion and would eliminate the need to analyze the 
proximity of the goods and services.72 
Courts sometimes focus on the proximity between the goods 
and services that the domain name offers and those the 
trademarked company offers in order to ascertain whether Internet 
users are likely to be confused.73 However, the proximity of the 
                                                          
Supp. 2d 582, 588 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
68 See id. 
69 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78. 
70 See Texas Int’l, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 591. 
71 People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 
915, 919–20 (E.D. Va. 2000). Interestingly, the acronym used in the website was 
different from the plaintiff’s mark (it stood for People Eating Tasty Animals), 
but the court held that this difference was immaterial. Id. at 918. 
72 See Texas Int’l., 624 F. Supp. 2d at 588; Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 
920. 
73 Compare Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 
504 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that the luncheon meat SPAM and the Muppets 
character Spa’am were dissimilar), with GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 
202 F.3d 1199, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that “GoTo” and “Go 
Network” were similar where both entities operated web search engines). See 
Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattell, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In the 
context of two subjectively dissimilar marks, evidence of actual confusion and 
evidence defining the context in which the goods are sold are particularly 
relevant.”). 
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goods and services of a website arguably has nothing to do with 
the brand name in question.74 For example, in Cintas Corp. v. 
Unite Here, the plaintiff was unable to prove that the disputed 
website, “cintasexposed.com” was confusingly similar to the 
CINTAS mark since there was “no proximity between the parties’ 
goods and services.”75 The defendant’s website did not function as 
a source identifier; instead, the website served to “criticize Cintas’ 
corporate practices.”76 Therefore, this second factor can either 
demonstrate consumer confusion, or it can establish that the 
website does not confuse consumers.  
2. The Bad Faith Intent Requirement 
In addition to the ACPA’s requirement for a likelihood of 
confusion, the plaintiff must also establish that the defendant 
intended, in bad faith, to profit from the plaintiff’s trademark by 
registering the domain name.77 Congress designed the ACPA to 
“combat deliberate, bad faith, and abusive” registration of a 
domain name.78 The ACPA includes a list of nine non-exclusive 
factors that allow the court to infer bad faith intent on the part of 
the impostor.79 Under the safe harbor provision, if the court finds 
                                                          
74 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 25:78. McCarthy argues that this second 
factor is irrelevant for cybersquatting because many of these websites will not 
even be set up. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 6 (1999) (“These 
cyberpirates have no intention of using the domain name in commerce and 
instead often attempt to exact money from a company in exchange for domain 
names that relate to that company’s trademarks.”). 
75 Cintas Corp. v. Unite Here, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
76 See id.  
77 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (West 2006). 
78 Flentye v. Kathrein, 485 F. Supp. 2d 903, 913–14 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (citing 
Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 238 F.3d 624, 627 (4th Cir. 
2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
79 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).  These bad faith factors include:  
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if 
any, in the domain name; (II) the extent to which the domain name 
consists of the legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise 
commonly used to identify that person; (III) the person’s prior use, if 
any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of 
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that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
domain name was available for fair use, then the defendant does 
not have the bad faith intent required by the ACPA.80 
Although courts will typically examine all of the ACPA 
elements for bad faith intent and determine if the elements favor 
either party, each element is not exclusive.81 When most of the 
elements cut in favor of the trademark owner, the court will infer 
bad faith intent.82 For example, in Citigroup v. Chen Bao Shui, the 
court held that defendant Chen Bao Shui’s registration of the 
                                                          
any goods or services; (IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or 
fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name; (V) the 
person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s online 
location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the 
goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with 
the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of 
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of 
the site; (VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the 
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain 
without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the 
bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the person’s prior 
conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VII) the person’s 
provision of material and misleading false contact information when 
applying for the registration of the domain name, the person’s 
intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the 
person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VIII) the 
person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which the 
person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others 
that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or 
dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of 
registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or 
services of the parties; and (IX) the extent to which the mark 
incorporated in the person’s domain name registration is or is not 
distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c) of this 
section.    
Id. 
80 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
81 Id. See, e.g., Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 106 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that since a majority of the elements favored Fornario, he had a 
“colorable defense” to the cybersquatting claim); Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 
F.3d 534, 549 (6th Cir. 2006) (maintaining that the majority of the elements cut 
against the defendant, thereby satisfying the bad faith intent requirement).    
82 Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 549. 
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website “citybank.org” did not create intellectual property rights in 
the domain name.83 Prior to the registration of the website, Chen 
Bao Shui did not use the domain name to offer any goods or 
services.84 In addition, the court maintained that Chen Bao Shui 
intended to “confuse, mislead, and divert Internet traffic to garner 
click-through revenue” through false Citibank advertisements.85 
Finally, the court noted that Chen Bao Shui registered multiple 
domain names identical to Citibank’s marks.86  When considering 
the ACPA’s bad faith factors, the court easily held that Chen Bao 
Shui acted in bad faith.87  
C. Trademark Infringement with Metatags 
Trademark infringement on the Internet is not limited to 
cybersquatting and such infringement includes the abusive use of 
metatags.88  However, the ACPA does not apply to metatags.89  
Indeed, the language of the ACPA provides an action only against 
an individual who “registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name.”90  
The ACPA defines a “domain name” as “any alphanumeric 
designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain 
name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name 
registration authority as part of an electronic address on the 
Internet.”91  A metatag does not meet this definition because it is 
not assigned by a domain name registrar, but instead is entirely 
                                                          
83 Citigroup, Inc. v. Chen Bao Shui, 611 F. Supp. 2d 507, 511 (E.D. Va. 
2009).  
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 510–12 (noting that defendant registered multiple domain names 
similar to Citigroup’s registered marks: “Citibank,” “Citifield,” and 
“Citifinancial”). 
87 Id. at 512. 
88 See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:69. 
89 See Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).   
90 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1125(d)(A)(1)(ii) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
91 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 
2006). 
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controlled by the web page creator.92   
Even though metatags fall outside of the scope of the ACPA, 
infringing use of such devices is still actionable under the Lanham 
Act.93  The rationale for such protection is that the abusive use of 
metatags creates an initial interest problem: the consumer, who is 
deceptively lured to a competitor’s website might choose to 
conduct business there rather than search for his intended 
destination.94 Unlike with the ACPA, courts engage in the 
traditional lengthy likelihood of confusion analysis for metatag 
infringement, which typically consists of eight factors.95  Passing 
this lengthy test is not easy,96 but trademark owners nevertheless 
have recourse for metatag infringement.97 
                                                          
92 See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:69. 
93 See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 762 
(E.D. Mich. 2003).  However, some courts, such as the Second Circuit, do not 
entirely recognize metatag infringement as a trademark cause of action. See 1-
800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409 (holding that 
“internal utilization of a trademark in a way that does not communicate it to the 
public” does not constitute “use” and thus does not violate the Lanham Act).   
94 See Promatek Indus. Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 
2002) (“Consumers who are directed to Equitrac’s webpage [as a result of the 
infringing metatag] are likely to learn more about Equitrac and its products 
before beginning a new search for Promatek and Copitrak.”); Brookfield 
Commc’ns Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp, 174 F.3d, 1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“Using another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like posting a sign with 
another’s trademark in front of one’s store.”).  
95 See N.Y. State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis, 79 F. 
Supp. 2d 331, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. 
Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961)).  The Polaroid factors for likelihood of 
confusion include:  
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the degree of similarity 
between the two marks; (3) the competitive proximity of the products 
or services; (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will “bridge the gap” 
between the two markets; (5) the existence of actual confusion; (6) the 
defendant’s good faith in adopting its mark; (7) the quality of the 
defendant’s product; and (8) the sophistication of the purchasers.  
Id.  
96 See, e.g., Bihari v. Gross, 199 F. Supp. 2d, 309, 318–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(finding that the abusive use of metatags did not create a likelihood of 
confusion).   
97 See Promatek Indus. Ltd., 300 F.3d at 812 (holding a likelihood of 
confusion was probable after applying a seven factor likelihood of confusion 
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II. CYBERSQUATTING AND TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT IN THE 
SOCIAL MEDIA ARENA 
In light of the popularity of social media websites, corporations 
have created profiles on these websites to gain more customers.98 
Website administrators have extended the username feature to 
corporations who wish to use the feature to build a strong 
reputation for their marks.99 Although Tony La Russa dropped his 
suit against Twitter, his case highlighted the hazards of the new 
username features on these websites.100 The ACPA is applicable in 
the social networking venue, but prospective plaintiffs might have 
difficulty proving that defendant acted with the bad faith intent 
required by the ACPA.101   
A. The Hazards of Name Squatting and Hashtag Infringement 
1. Name Squatting: Why it Matters 
The reservation of usernames and the abusive use of tags are 
particularly harmful to trademark owners. Facebook admits that 
username infringement can “be a big deal[,] especially if someone 
else is looking to build a reputation using a brand name that you’ve 
spent a long time building.”102 Cybersquatting via username 
infringement prevents the trademark owner from using that 
recognizable username, and thereby inhibits his ability to use his 
brand name on that particular social media website.103 Reserving a 
username, much like reserving a domain name, allows the 
                                                          
test); N.Y. State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 340–42 
(holding that the infringing use of metatags passed the Polaroid test).   
98 See William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in 
Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1119 (2009) [hereinafter, 
McGeveran, Disclosure]. 
99 See id. 
100 See MacMillan, supra note 24. 
101 See infra Part II.C. 
102 Nick O’Neill, How to Get Your Facebook Username Back From a 
Squatter, ALLFACEBOOK (June 22, 2009, 10:04 AM), http://www.allfacebook. 
com/2009/06/facebook-username-squatter/.   
103 See id. 
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impostor to prevent the trademark owner from using his brand 
name in a useful market.104  
Moreover, the reservation of a username by an impostor can 
tarnish and dilute the reputation of the mark. When someone 
reserves a username in bad faith, the trademark owner loses control 
over the reputation of his brand name. For example, in Clean 
Flicks, Inc. v. Daniel Dean Thompson, the defendant’s 
cybersquatting tainted the Clean Flicks mark.105 Specifically, the 
defendant registered Clean Flicks Media as his username on 
Myspace and tried to pass himself off as one of the founders of the 
company.106 The problem with this reservation was that the 
defendant was arrested for possession of child pornography, 
statutory rape, and other crimes which were completely at odds 
with Clean Flicks’ reputation as a family entertainment business.107 
In the immediate aftermath of the arrest, news stories linked Clean 
Flicks Media to the defendant because of the Myspace page,108 and 
Clean Flicks had to sue in order to defend its reputation.109 
Therefore, reserving usernames leaves trademark owners without 
control over the reputation of their marks, which could be 
detrimental to the mark’s power. 
                                                          
104 See Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=897 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (explaining that users must choose a “unique” 
username). See, e.g., Morrison & Foerster, LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 
1126–27 (D. Colo. 2000) (discussing how registering a domain name precludes 
trademark owners from using their brand names). See generally McGeveran, 
Disclosure, supra note 98 (discussing the value of social media as a medium for 
marketing). 
105 See Complaint at 6, Clean Flicks, Inc. v. Daniel Dean Thompson, No. 
2:08-cv-0086-PMW (D. Utah Feb. 1, 2008) available at http://www.schwimmer 
legal.com/Complaint%20clean%20flicks.pdf [hereinafter Complaint, Clean 
Flicks]. See also Nate Anderson, Sex, Drugs, and Dirty Movies: CleanFlicks 
Sues Doppelganger, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 5, 2008), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2008/02/sex-drugs-and-dirty-movies-cleanflicks-sues 
cyberpirate.ars. 
106 Id.  
107 Complaint, Clean Flicks, supra note 105, at 4; Anderson, supra note 
105. 
108 Complaint, Clean Flicks, supra note 105, at 4. 
109 See Anderson, supra note 105. 
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2. The Dangers of Hashtag Infringement 
Much like name squatting, hashtag infringement is a significant 
problem on Twitter.  Hashtags, much like metatags, allow 
individuals to place words in their profiles and on tweets, which in 
turn show up on search engines.110  By allowing individuals free 
control over the content of their tags in tweets, individuals have 
abused this feature and in turn, inflicted harm on the power and 
distinctiveness of a brand name.  
Taco John’s is one of the more recent victims of infringing use 
of hashtags.  In August 2010, Taco John’s sent a cease and desist 
letter to Iguana Grill for their usage of the hashtag “#tacotuesday,” 
which they maintained was an infringing use of their registered 
trademark “Taco Tuesday.”111  However, sending this letter 
backfired on Taco John’s as the story garnered media attention; 
individuals began to use the hashtag freely in their tweets and due 
to the media attention, Iguana sold a record number of tacos in one 
day.112 
The Taco John’s example demonstrates the dangers of  an 
infringing use of a hashtag.  Although hashtag use does not 
preclude the trademark owner from using the mark,113 the free use 
of a brand name in a hashtag can dilute the trademark or possibly 
even lead to genericide.114 The more freely a brand, such as “Taco 
Tuesday,” is used, the less likely consumers will recognize the 
term as a source identifier.115  When a term loses its function as a 
source identifier, the trademark becomes generic and loses its 
distinctiveness.116  Without distinctiveness, a trademark is not 
entitled to protection.117 
                                                          
110 What are Hashtags?, TWITTER HELP CENTER, http://support.twitter.com/ 
entries/49309-what-are-hashtags-symbols (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). 
111 See Emily E. Campbell, Taco John’s Claims Rights in Taco Tuesday, 
PHOSITA: AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BLOG (Aug. 4, 2010), http://dunlap 
codding.com/phosita/2010/08/taco-johns-claims-rights-in-taco-tuesday.html.   
112 See id. 
113 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §25:69. 
114 See id. 
115 See Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 54, at 244–45. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
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B. Efforts to Curtail Username Infringement 
1. Facebook’s Policy 
In an effort to learn from and avoid the pitfalls of Twitter’s and 
Myspace’s lax guidelines with username features, Facebook 
implemented safeguards to protect trademark owners on its 
website.118 Facebook reserves the right to reclaim usernames on 
the website if they infringe on a trademark.119 Trademark owners 
are responsible for reporting any trademark infringement on a 
username infringement form Facebook provides.120 On the form, 
trademark owners are expected to provide proof of registration and 
explain how the username infringes on their mark.121 If the 
trademark owner successfully establishes infringement, then 
Facebook will transfer the username to the trademark owner.122  
Facebook also encouraged trademark owners to reserve 
usernames before the launch of the feature on June 13, 2009.123 To 
reserve a username before June 13, users had to have at least one 
thousand followers, which is a difficult task for a cybersquatter to 
achieve.124 New users were otherwise not permitted to register 
until June 28, 2009 to prevent people from creating multiple 
                                                          
118 See Macmillan, supra note 24. 
119 See Blaise DiPersia, Coming Soon: Facebook Usernames, THE 
FACEBOOK BLOG (June 9, 2009, 12:11PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog. 
php?post=90316352130; see also Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.face 
book.com/help/?page=897 (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (explaining that 
Facebook will reclaim any username that it determines to be squatting).  
120 See Report an Infringing Username, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook. 
com/help/contact.php?show_form=username_infringement (last visited Sept. 25, 
2010). 
121 See id.  
122 See id. 
123 Facebook Pages, Facebook Usernames Coming Soon for Pages, 
FACEBOOK (June 9, 2009, 4:32 PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php? 
post=90316352130. 
124 See generally “New Facebook Policy Could Invite Cybersquatting,” 
INDIANAPOLIS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Jun. 22, 2009 (discussing how many 
experts agree that the risk of classic cybersquatting is rather minimal in this 
venue). 
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accounts to reserve usernames in bulk.125 In addition, when the 
username feature launched in 2009, Facebook allowed certain 
users, namely corporations, to flag certain names that might 
conflict with the owner’s trademark.126 
Facebook has a verification feature to prevent any future harm 
to brand names.127 In an attempt to avoid “name squatting,” 
Facebook announced that usernames may now require “mobile 
phone authentication.”128 Thus, in order to obtain a username, the 
individual might need to verify the account by phone. It remains to 
be seen whether Facebook will stringently enforce such 
verification. It is also not clear what other loopholes may appear in 
this approach; for example, whether the cybersquatter could still 
pose as the trademark owner if Facebook were to contact him.   
2. Twitter’s Policy 
Twitter has also created a verification feature to prevent 
confusion.129 Twitter maintains that it created the feature to 
“establish authenticity for accounts who deal with identity 
confusion regularly on Twitter.”130 Unlike Facebook, Twitter uses 
“verification badges” which signal to users that the profile is not 
fake.131 Interestingly, Twitter’s mechanism does not yet apply to 
all businesses, as the website is currently testing a verification 
feature for businesses.132 Currently, the feature is available only to 
“public officials, public agencies, famous artists, athletes, and 
other well known individuals at risk of impersonation.”133 Some 
                                                          
125 See id.  
126 Facebook Pages, supra note 123. 
127 See Macmillan, supra note 24. 
128 Help Center, FACEBOOK, supra note 104.  
129 See About Verified Accounts, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/ 
groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/111features/articles/119135-about-verified-
accounts (last visited Sept. 25, 2010). 
130 Id.  
131 Id. 
132 Business Verification, TWITTER, http://twitter.zendesk.com/76487-can-i-
verify-my-business-account (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
133 Emma Barnett, Twitter Launches Verification Service to Protect 
Celebrities, TELEGRAPH (June 8, 2009, 11:04 AM BST), http://www.telegraph. 
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corporations have access to the verification feature during the 
testing period, but at this point, many are not able to benefit from 
this feature.134  
A search of Twitter reveals that corporations are susceptible to 
username infringement, especially those owning famous brand 
names.135 When Twitter first created its username feature, 
cybersquatters scrambled to reserve usernames that were 
substantially similar or identical to famous brand names.136  In 
2009, impostors reserved usernames such as Volkswagen,137 which 
Twitter has since transferred to the rightful owners.138 One of the 
more notable examples was “@Hyundai,” a profile that contained 
pictures of scantily clad woman and telling users to “have a lustful 
day.”139  After Hyundai threatened to sue Twitter over the 
profile,140 the site’s administrators transferred the username to the 
                                                          
co.uk/technology/twitter/5475445/Twitter-launches-verification-service-to-
protect-celebrities.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
134 See Business Verification, TWITTER, supra note 132. For example, 
Target has a verified business account. See Target, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/ 
target (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).   
135 Willis Wee, 10 Brands Claimed by Twitter Cybersquatters, PENN-
OLSON (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.penn-olson.com/2009/09/21/10-brands-
claimed-by-twitter-cybersquatters/ (discussing various brand names that 
succumbed to name squatting). One of these fake profiles had over 1,000 
followers during 2009, but many of these usernames have either been suspended 
or transferred to the rightful owners. Id. The lack of activity (many have no 
tweets) on these pages serves as evidence that these profiles are held by 
impostors. 
136 See id. 
137 Id. 
138 See Volkswagen, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/volkswagen (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2010). Previously, the owner of the profile solicited bids for 
individuals to purchase the username “@volkswagen.”  See Wee, supra note 
135.  However, the profile now contains the company’s logos, directs customers 
to the official Volkswagen website, has over 600 tweets, and has close to 9,000 
followers.  See Volkswagen, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/volkswagen (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2010).  Thus, the profile has clearly been transferred to 
Volkswagen. 
139 Stephen Calogera, Hyundai Falls Victim to Cybersquatters on Twitter, 
EGMCARTECH (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.egmcartech.com/2009/11/10/ 
hyundai-falls-victim-to-cyber-squatters-on-twitter/. 
140 Id. 
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company.141 However, the problem still exists, as impostors 
currently reserved famous brand names including Apple,142 
Macbook,143 Carvel,144 Nike,145 Adidas,146 Ikea,147 Neiman 
Marcus,148 and DSquared.149 Thus, cybersquatters have abused and 
continue to abuse the username feature on Twitter. 
In light of the wave of these fake profiles, Twitter amended its 
policy. Much like the username infringement form on Facebook, 
companies can complain to the site’s administrators about a case of 
username infringement.150 Twitter requires that in order for there to 
be name squatting, the account must be active and that there have 
been “attempts to sell, buy, or solicit other forms of payment in 
exchange for usernames.”151 Conversely, accounts without status 
updates that contain no profile image typically indicates “that 
there’s no name-squatting or impersonation.”152 
For non-cybersquatting cases, Twitter has a catch-all trademark 
policy. 153  Trademark owners can report any infringing use of their 
                                                          
141 See Hyundai, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/hyundai (last visited Sept. 15, 
2010). Hyundai now owns this username and profile. See Calogera, supra note 
139. 
142 See Apple, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/Apple (last visited Sept. 15, 
2010). 
143  See Macbook, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/macbook (last visited Sept. 
15, 2010). 
144  See Carvel, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/carvel (last visited Sept. 15, 
2010). 
145  See Nike, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/nike (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
See also NIk!, MYSPACE, http://myspace.com/nike (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
146  See Adidas, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/adidas (last visited Sept. 15, 
2010). 
147  See Ikea, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/ikea (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
148  See Neiman Marcus, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/neimanmarcus (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
149  See Dsqaured, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/dsquared (last visited Sept. 
15, 2010). 
150 See Name Squatting Policy, TWITTER HELP CENTER, http://support. 
twitter.com/articles/18370-name-squatting-policy (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 See Trademark Policy, TWITTER HELP CENTER, http://support.twitter. 
com/entries/18367 (last visited Oct. 15, 2010). 
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marks to Twitter’s administrators.154  Because Twitter does not 
want to inhibit free speech and expression on news feeds and 
hashtags, the administrators do “not actively monitor users’ 
content and will not edit or remove user content.” 155 Rather, the 
trademark owners are  expected to police their marks and report 
any infringing use. 156 When reporting infringing use of a mark on 
devices such as hashtags, the trademark owner must provide proof 
of registration.157  Unregistered marks are not protected under this 
mechanism.158 
Currently, it appears that Twitter vigorously enforces this 
policy.  For example, in December 2009, after receiving 
complaints about an infringing username on the Heinz trademark, 
Twitter changed the username without consulting the profile 
owner.159 Likewise, Twitter transferred the Hyundai username to 
the rightful owners after the company complained.160 Even with 
such enforcement, however, the policy is reactive rather than 
proactive. Companies must wait until the infringement has 
occurred before they may file a complaint.161 In that period of 
time, the damage may already have occurred, as it had with the BP 
and Clean Flicks profiles.162 Therefore, although companies have 
options to protect their brand names, Twitter’s current policy does 
little to protect them from trademark infringement and potential 
harm to their brand names. 
                                                          
154 Id. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. 
157 Id. 
158 See id. 
159 Jason Turbow, The Great Ketchup Experiment: Cybersquatting and the 
Power of Social Media, BAYNEWSER (Feb. 17, 2010, 12:57 PM), http://www. 
mediabistro.com/baynewser/twitter/the_great_ketchup_experiment_cybersquatti
ng_and_the_power_of_social_media_152333.asp (discussing how Twitter 
transferred the username “HJ Heinz” to “NotHJ_Heinz”).   
160 See Hyundai, TWITTER HELP CENTER, supra note 141; see also 
Calogera, supra note 139. 
161 See Name Squatting Policy, TWITTER, supra note 150.   
162 See supra text accompanying notes 27–29, 105–109. 
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C. ACPA and Username Infringement 
The ACPA, enacted over ten years ago, addressed the abusive 
registration of full quality domain names.163 Legislators, however, 
did not foresee the launch and exponential growth of the Internet 
during the “Web 2.0” phenomenon; such lack of foresight is 
evident with the limitation of the ACPA to top level domain 
names.164 In light of this new venue, the ACPA, while somewhat 
dated, nevertheless gives trademark owners a remedy to such 
abusive registrations.165   
1. The Likelihood of Confusion 
With the growth of popularity in social networking websites, 
one must wonder whether, in this context, username infringement 
is likely to cause any confusion among consumers. As a marketing 
channel, the Internet “is particularly susceptible to a likelihood of 
confusion since . . . it allows for competing marks to be 
encountered at the same time, on the same screen.”166 The search 
costs of stumbling on an impostor’s profile, however, are rather 
minimal; the Internet user merely has to click the back button to 
leave the page.167  
Under the ACPA, courts do not address “whether the accused 
domain name is confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s domain name, 
but whether it is confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s trademark or 
                                                          
163 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78. 
164 See O’Reilly, supra note 2 (describing the rise of personal homepages 
during the Web 2.0 phenomenon). Such websites would not include top level 
domain names. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1127 (West 2006) (“The term ‘domain name’ means any alphanumeric 
designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar, 
domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an 
electronic address on the Internet.”). 
165 In light of Web 2.0 and increased user control, see O’Reilly, supra note 
2 (discussing increased user control in the Web 2.0 phenomenon), this Note 
argues for an expansion of the definition of “domain name.” See infra Part IV.A. 
166 GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
167 See id. at 1209. 
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service mark.”168 Thus, a vanity URL that is confusingly similar to 
a plaintiff’s trademark would satisfy the first requirement of the 
ACPA.169 Because vanity URLs function as domain names,170 an 
infringement claim for name squatting would mirror the likelihood 
of confusion analysis with domain names.171 
2. Bad Faith Intent on Social Media Websites 
Congress created the ACPA to prevent abusive registrations of 
domain names.172 On the one hand, some evidence that judges use 
to ascertain whether a defendant abusively registered a domain 
name in bad faith will be applicable to this analysis in the 
username context.173 On the other hand, the reservation of one’s 
nickname as a username presents judges with a unique problem in 
evaluating the bad faith element.174   
Nicknames could present courts with a problem in determining 
whether an individual reserved a username in bad faith. Myspace, 
Twitter, and Facebook allow their users to reserve usernames, 
which serve as URL shortcuts to a profile.175 Such usernames can 
conflict with famous marks, particularly if the mark and nickname 
are similar. For example, an individual on Myspace reserved the 
username “Nike” because his nickname is “Nik. E.”176 The 
                                                          
168 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78. 
169 See id. For a full discussion of the “presumption of confusion” standard, 
see infra Part I.B.1. 
170 GoTo.com, Inc., 202 F.3d at 1207; see also Wakiyama and Kagan, 
supra note 18 (discussing how Facebook usernames function as URLs).   
171 See Texas Int’l. Prop. Assoc. v. Hoerbiger Holding AG, 624 F. Supp. 2d 
582, 588 (N.D. Tex. 2009); People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. 
Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 919–20 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
172 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78. 
173 Id. 
174 Id.  
175 See supra text accompanying notes 18–20. 
176 Many users on Myspace have registered usernames that are substantially 
similar to famous brands. See, e.g., Nik!, MYSPACE, supra note 145. On this 
profile, the user seems to have reserved a nickname. Id. On others, the user 
seems to have reserved the famous brand name as an online nickname, but is not 
one that he is commonly referred to. See, e.g., Doddio, MYSPACE, 
http://www.myspace.com/stopnshop (last updated Feb. 11, 2010, 2:58 AM). 
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reservation of this username was performed in good faith, but it 
prevents Nike from using its trademark on Myspace.177 
The legal name safe harbor of the ACPA merely provides a 
court with “the appropriate discretion to determine whether or not 
the fact that a person bears a nickname similar to a mark at issue is 
an indication of an absence of bad-faith on the part of the 
registrant.”178 The crafters of the ACPA of course did not intend 
for this provision to permit users to make up a nickname that is 
substantially similar to a well-known brand name.179 However, 
individuals could attempt to reserve a domain name with a “word 
that they claim as a ‘nickname’ which is allegedly ‘commonly 
used’ to refer to them, but which is very similar to that of a well-
known trademark.”180   
A legal name would fall under the safe harbor provision of the 
ACPA because the applicant could have registered the username in 
good faith.181 A person, however, could also assert that they use a 
commonly used word as a nickname, which also happens to be 
similar to a trademark.182 Such username reservations would 
present judges with a situation in which it would not be clear 
whether the username was reserved in bad faith.183 Some users will 
obviously do this in bad faith and assert that their use of the 
nickname falls under the safe harbor provision.184 Fortunately, one 
may not assert a good faith claim under the safe harbor provision 
after the dispute over the username arises.185 The line between 
                                                          
177  See Nik!, MySpace, supra note 145. 
178 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 
10 (1999)). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 See, e.g., Int’l Bancorp v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des 
Estrangers a Monaco, 192 F.Supp. 2d 467,485 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“A putative 
cyberpirate can satisfy this factor only if its name or commonly-used nickname 
is the same as the domain name in dispute.”). A legal name is generally a 
person’s name. See id. 
182 Id. 
183 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 25:78. 
184 See id. (“For example, consider the hypothetical Roberto Wayne who 
registers the domain name sonywalkman.net and who claims that this is justified 
because his friends call him “sony” and that he is a man who walks a lot.”). 
185 See id. A good faith claim “cannot be founded upon some purported 
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such claims, however, would be rather blurry. Courts will be 
forced to choose between a person’s right to use his nickname in a 
social setting against the proprietary interests of the trademark 
owner.186 Ascertaining whether someone used that nickname in 
good faith would entail an examination as to how extensively the 
impostor used the nickname in the past and whether he created the 
nickname to be identified with a particular source.187 Such an 
examination, however, would be difficult and expensive.188 
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENFORCING TRADEMARK RIGHTS ON 
SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES 
Although there are loopholes that allow users to reserve a 
username that infringes on a famous brand name, trademark 
owners still have options to protect their rights.189 There are two 
problems with allowing individuals to sue for trademark 
infringement in social media websites.  First, trademark owners 
might become too strategic in their enforcement of their trademark 
rights by suing the social media websites for infringement.  
Second, trademark owners will overly enforce their trademark 
rights to the point that it will stifle speech in a socially valuable 
setting.  Given the redressability of trademark rights, the 
enforcement of these rights must be limited in order to avoid 
frivolous lawsuits and impermissible infringement on free speech. 
A. Contributory Infringement by Social Networking Sites 
In La Russa’s complaint, he accused Twitter of cybersquatting 
via contributory infringement.190 La Russa would likely have lost 
his case, as registration sites, such as Twitter, are generally not 
                                                          
good faith use of the domain name undertaken only after the dispute arose and 
motivated by a desire to fabricate a good faith defense.” Id. 
186 See id. See infra Part III.B, for a fuller discussion of this tension. 
187 See Int’l Bancorp, 192 F. Supp 2d at 485. 
188 Id. 
189 See id. 
190 See Complaint, La Russa, supra note 30, at 2 (arguing that since Twitter 
maintained the domain name, it was contributorily liable for third party 
infringement). 
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liable for violations of the ACPA.191 Judges do not recognize 
contributory liability for registration sites because the operator of 
the registration site has no role in creating the website’s content.192  
The ACPA strictly limits liability for “the domain name registrant 
or that registrant’s authorized licensee” when registering infringing 
domain names.193 Registration sites, therefore, are not the 
appropriate defendants for such lawsuits.  
In the social networking setting, La Russa’s claim against 
Twitter should be precluded by Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”),194 a statute that deals 
primarily with defamatory or otherwise illegal content.195 The 
CDA states that no “provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”196 
A social networking site, which is a provider of interactive 
computer service, would thus be immune under this statute.197 
Some courts have refused to grant this immunity for Interactive 
Service Providers (“ISPs”) where the administrator “edits in a 
manner that contributes to the alleged illegality.”198 However, 
when an interactive service provider uses neutral tools that 
incidentally assist the alleged illegality, the ISP will generally be 
immune from liability.199 Invoking this analysis, a social 
                                                          
191 American Girl, LLC v. Nameview, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (E.D. 
Wis. 2005) (“[R]egistrars are not obliged to examine domain names to ensure 
that the registrant is not violating the rights of a third party.”). 
192 Parker v. Google, 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 503 (E.D. Pa. 2006); but see 
Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 752, 765 (N.D. Ill. 2008) 
(holding that Google could be held liable for third party infringement because 
they allegedly paid registrants for registering infringing domain names). 
193 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(1)(D) (West 2006). 
194 See MacMillan, supra note 24. 
195 Id. 
196 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c) (West 1998). 
197 See MacMillan, supra note 24 (noting that Google, MySpace, AOL, and 
Craigslist are immune under CDA).  
198 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 
521 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008). 
199 E.g., Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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networking website would generally be liable if the administrators 
edited the content of the username or profile in a way which 
created infringement.200 Neutral mechanisms, like the registration 
of a username, would not be sufficient under this analysis.201  
La Russa cleverly avoided this immunity provision by asserting 
a cybersquatting claim.202 Under Section 230(e) of the CDA, the 
immunity provision is not intended to “limit or expand” 
intellectual property law.203 A trademark infringement claim such 
as La Russa’s would circumvent this immunity provision because 
the claim would be predicated on trademark infringement, and 
Section 230(e) provides that the immunity provision should not be 
construed to limit trademark law. On the one hand, by granting 
outright immunity to any ISP, trademark owners would have no 
relief against websites that are complicit with infringing 
activities.204 From a policy perspective, however, granting a 
trademark cause of action against a social networking website is 
troubling, for it seems to undermine the spirit of CDA.205  By 
asserting a cybersquatting or metatag infringement claim, a 
plaintiff would be able to preclude immunity and sue social 
networking sites for third party infringement.206 
Despite these problems, judges do not tend to recognize such 
claims against neutral third party websites.207 The ACPA does not 
mention secondary liability and thus this theory is primarily 
derived from the common law.208 Similar to the analysis under the 
                                                          
200 Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1169. 
201 Id. 
202 See Complaint, La Russa, supra note 30, at 4 (arguing that since Twitter 
maintained the domain name, it was contributorily liable for third party 
infringement). 
203 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(2) (West 1998). 
204 See MacMillan, supra note 24. 
205 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c). 
206 Id. 
207 See Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 983 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
208 See, e.g., Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. 456 U.S. 
844, 855 (1982) (establishing the rule for contributory infringement for 
products); Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 983 (discussing the rule for 
contributory infringement for services). 
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CDA, domain registration sites209 generally cannot be held liable 
for contributory infringement because the registration of websites 
typically does not entail intentional inducement to create infringing 
products on a mark.210 The court in Lockheed Martin v. Network 
Solutions held that third parties offering services must have direct 
control and monitoring over the instrumentality in order to be held 
liable.211 Likewise, in Tiffany v. eBay, a case involving counterfeit 
goods, the Second Circuit held that in order for there to be 
contributory infringement, “a service provider must have more 
than a general knowledge or a reason to know that its service is 
being used to sell counterfeit goods.”212 Rather, the court reasoned 
that the “contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are 
infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary.”213 
Under the Tiffany standard, social networking sites would not 
be liable for cybersquatting if the administrators did not have 
specific and contemporary knowledge of the trademark 
infringement.214 Without specific knowledge, there would not be 
direct control over the instrumentalities, the requirement 
articulated by the court in Lockheed-Martin.215 Even with specific 
knowledge, if the website takes reasonable steps to curtail the 
infringement, as eBay did, then the website cannot be held 
contributorily liable for cybersquatting.216 Without specific 
knowledge or inaction, there would be no intentional inducement 
and thus no contributory infringement.217 Consequently, unless a 
social networking site monitors and controls the reservation of an 
infringing username, and makes no effort to ameliorate the 
                                                          
209 See, e.g., REGISTER.COM, http://www.register.com/ (last visited Sept. 16, 
2010).  A domain registration site allows an individual to reserve a domain name 
or renew an expired domain name, and even offers services such as search 
engine optimization.  See id. 
210 See Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d  at 983.   
211 Id. at 985. 
212 Tiffany (N.J.), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010). 
213 Id. 
214 See id. 
215 See  Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 985 (9th Cir. 1999) 
216 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107–10. 
217 Id. at 107. 
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problem, the site should not be held liable.218 
B. Effects on Free Speech Rights on the Internet 
The enforcement of trademark rights regulates use of a mark to 
prevent dilution or genericide of the mark.219 The First 
Amendment of the Constitution, on the other hand, affords 
individuals the right to free speech, which gives individuals the 
right to express themselves for political and social reasons, among 
others.220 In contrast, trademark law is about preventing the use of 
a word, slogan, or design by someone other than the mark 
owner.221 In the context of social media websites, the regulation of 
both username vanity URLs and hashtags would prevent people 
from using a particular mark in a social setting, where the First 
Amendment generally protects expression.222 The protection of a 
trademark and the right to free speech are therefore at odds with 
one another. The monopolization of a popular term, particularly 
one with cultural significance, could stifle artistic expression, 
criticism, and other social speech.223  
The general rule for free speech in trademark law is that if the 
use of the mark in speech is noncommercial or nominative it will 
not pose a threat to the trademark owner’s interests.224 The courts 
currently define “commercial speech” as speech that “does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction” in a manner 
“removed from any exposition of ideas.”225 Noncommercial speech 
                                                          
218 See id.   
219 William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205, 1225 (2008) [hereinafter 
McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals].  
220 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
221 See McGeveran, supra note 219.   
222 See supra Part II.A. 
223 See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 49, 65–66 (2008) [hereinafter McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair 
Use]. 
224 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 
308 (9th Cir. 1992).  
225 Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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encompasses speech that is not economically motivated, and is 
instead used describe the mark or to criticize it.226 This could entail 
social criticism, as in Mattel v. RCA Records.227 In Mattel, the 
Ninth Circuit held that Aqua’s song “Barbie Girl,” a 1990s one hit 
wonder, was protected speech because it was a parody on Barbie, a 
cultural figure.228  Similarly, nominative speech is protected 
because even if used in a commercial setting, the mark is merely 
used to designate the actual owner and is thereby deemed to be fair 
use.229 
Use of a mark, even if used for criticism, can be problematic 
for trademark owners. Before the growth of the Internet, criticism 
was limited to small circles and did not spread rapidly throughout 
society.230 Cyberspace is a potentially problematic venue for 
trademark owners because criticism can be widely disseminated 
and trademark owners can thereby lose control over the reputation 
of their marks.231 Social networking sites are even more 
problematic because they are heavily used and word of mouth 
spreads quickly on those websites.232 In addition, by permitting 
everyone to use a trademark on the Internet, the mark could lose its 
function as a source identifier and thereby become a generic 
                                                          
226 See Smith v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1339–40 
(N.D. Ga. 2008) (holding that defendant’s use of the terms “Wal-Qaeda” and 
“Walocaust” constituted noncommercial speech because the defendant used the 
term expressively, and his economic motives were secondary at most). By 
definition cybersquatting is per se commercial speech.  See MCCARTHY, supra 
note 12, §25:78.  However, mere reservation of a website cannot constitute per 
se commercial speech. See id. 
227 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing how Aqua’s song, “Barbie Girl” criticized the source). 
228  Id. 
229 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308–09. Such speech would 
include a comparison made in an advertisement to differentiate or situate one’s 
brand in the market. Id. 
230 See McGeveran, Disclosure, supra note 98, at 1122–27. 
231 See id. Indeed, this was the case with the fake BP account on Twitter. 
See Stelter, supra note 27. 
232 See generally Stelter, supra note 26 (discussing how within the span of 
months, 145,000 followers began to follow the fake BP profile, which produced 
damaging tweets).   
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term.233 Therefore, it is understandable why trademark owners 
would want to control discussion and use of the mark on social 
media websites. 
The problem that arises from the enforcement of trademark 
rights is that the high cost of litigation will discourage users from 
expressing themselves in a social setting.234 In Smith v. Walmart 
Stores, Inc., a clear case of fair use, Walmart flooded the court 
with expert evidence and prolonged the trial for two years.235 
Indeed after receiving an ample amount of evidence, the court 
engaged in a lengthy likelihood of confusion analysis.236 A 
likelihood of confusion analysis requires significant evidence, 
specifically the use of expensive experts,237 and the length of a 
likelihood of confusion trial could result in expensive legal fees.238 
In the social media context, large and expensive law firms are 
already encouraging trademark owners to preemptively enforce 
their proprietary interests with regards to username 
infringement.239 The threat of litigation could stifle expression 
through creative usernames.240 If courts grant trademark owners a 
monopoly over a mark, it could inhibit expression because users 
simply would not want to risk being sued for trademark 
infringement.241  
A remedy for this problem, advocated by Professor Bill 
McGeveran, would be to weed out the obvious free speech 
                                                          
233 See McGeveran, Disclosure, supra note 98, at 1144–1145. 
234 See McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, supra note 223, at 52. 
235 See Smith v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1339–40 
(N.D. Ga. 2008) 
236 See id. 
237 See id. 
238 See McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, supra note 223, at 99. 
239 See, e.g., Lynn Humphreys, Protecting Your Trademark From 
Facebook Username Abuse, MORRISON & FOERSTER (June 11, 2009), 
http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/15669.html.  
240 See id. There is also the risk that judges won’t understand the humor in 
a parody or in criticism. See generally Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci, 28 F.3d 769 
(8th Cir. 1994).  In Balducci, the plaintiff’s parody (“Michelob Oily”) was not 
protected speech because the defendant used the Michelob mark as a weapon to 
criticize dependence on oil, not the source. Id. at 774–77. 
241 See McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, supra note 223, at 
51–66. 
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cases.242 If a username is used for criticism of the source, 
nominative use, or non-commercial fair use, then courts should 
dismiss the case.243 Rather than raising this affirmative defense 
after going through the prima facie elements for confusion, 
defendants should be able to raise this argument before going 
through the test.244 Litigation is costly and burdensome for 
defendants, and by shortening litigation, users would still be able 
to use words to express themselves without seriously infringing a 
mark.   
IV. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CYBERSQUATTING ON SOCIAL 
MEDIA WEBSITES 
The advent of username features on social networks could be 
much more than a nuisance to trademark owners if it poses a grave 
threat to their proprietary interests. If trademark owners do not 
enforce their rights in this realm, they will face the risk of 
genericide or dilution of their brand name.245 Users could post 
vulgar updates that would taint the reputation of the mark. There is 
also the potential of consumer confusion.246 If social media 
websites tolerate such genericide or dilution, it would result in a 
diminished potency of the brand name’s power in electronic 
commerce.247 Therefore, the loopholes in both the ACPA and in 
these websites’ policies need to be addressed to provide trademark 
owners with adequate protection.248 
                                                          
242 Id. at 122.  
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 54. 
246 See McGeveran, Disclosure, supra note 98, at 1144–45. 
247 See Nestle Co., Inc. v. Chester’s Market, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 763, 766–68  
(D. Conn. 1983) (discussing  marks that lose the power to identify the source 
and holding that the term “Toll House” lost its ability to identify Nestle as the 
source of the mark).   
248 See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(II) (West 2006) (establishing the legal name safe harbor); Id. at 
§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (establishing the “reasonable belief” safe harbor). 
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A. Remedies for Common Law Doctrine and the ACPA 
Since Congress did not foresee increased user control on the 
Internet, the ACPA is outdated and could potentially be deemed to 
be inapplicable in this venue. Therefore, Congress needs to clarify 
and amend certain provisions within the statute.   
First, metatag infringement should be separated from the 
Lanham Act. Trademark infringement on social media sites is not 
limited to username infringement. The ACPA would not reach 
these “hashtags” because social media sites do not control or 
assign the use of such search items.249 On the one hand, the 
infringing use of a metatag is not quite as harmful as it was in the 
days of Brookfield, as Internet users are not the luddites that courts 
assumed they were in the 1990s.250  Even so, the damage could be 
fairly far reaching, possibly even leading to genericide of the 
mark.251  Such tags would draw consumers to impostor profiles, 
confuse consumers, and weaken the brand’s power.252 The reason 
for creating a separate cause of action is that metatags are not a 
good fit for either the ACPA or the Lanham Act.  While these 
search terms do not have the preclusive effect of cybersquatting, 
they traffic Internet users to another site and in doing so, harm the 
trademark owner.253  
Courts examine these search items under the standard eight 
factor likelihood of confusion analysis,254 rather than employ the 
                                                          
249 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (defining domain name as one which is 
assigned by a registrar); What are Hashtags (# Symbols)?, TWITTER HELP 
CENTER, http://support.twitter.com/articles/49309-what-are-hashtags-symbols 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2010). 
250  See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“[E]ven modern-day Luddites are now capable of navigating 
cyberspace.”).  
251 See Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 54. 
252 See Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1246–47 
(D. Minn. 2005) (enjoining the defendant from future use of the plaintiff’s 
marks in metatags that could misdirect consumers to an infringing website). 
253 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §25:69. 
254 N.Y. State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis, 79 
F.Supp.2d 331, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (examining the metatag infringement under 
the Polaroid analysis).   
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condensed analysis articulated in GoTo.com v. Walt Disney.255  
Indeed, a judge would be hard-pressed to find that many of the 
eight factors are applicable on the Internet.256  Courts should depart 
from the eight factor analysis for metatag infringement because it 
is too difficult of a standard to pass,257 and instead should follow 
the two factor analysis under GoTo.com.258  
Second, Congress needs to clarify the ACPA’s bad faith 
provision. The ACPA creates a safe harbor for a registrant who 
registers a name “that is otherwise commonly used to identify that 
person.”259 Registration of such a name, which could include 
nicknames, would help to establish that the user did not register a 
domain name in bad faith.260 In the social media setting, 
scrutinizing whether the username was reserved in bad faith would 
be problematic because essentially all of the infringers would 
claim that the username is their nickname.261 In some cases, 
ascertaining whether the nickname was registered in bad faith 
would be easy, as the reservation of the username in such cases 
would satisfy many of the non-exclusive factors set forth in the 
ACPA.262 In other cases, the user might register a username in 
good faith not knowing of the similarity between his nickname and 
the trademark.263 Congress could clarify the provision by providing 
evidentiary standards to quickly and easily ascertain if the user 
reserved the username in good faith. 
Finally, Congress should harmonize the ACPA with Section 
230 of the CDA. The problem with Internet cases is that virtually 
                                                          
255 See GoTo.com, Inc., 202 F.3d at 1206–07. 
256 See id. 
257 See, e.g., Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 318–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(finding that the abusive use of metatags did not create a likelihood of 
confusion).   
258 See GoTo.com, Inc., 202 F.3d 1206–07.   
259 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(II) (West 2006). 
260 See infra Part II.C.2. 
261 CNN L.P. v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 524 (E.D. Va. 2001) 
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every trademark owner and celebrity could—and likely would—
assert a cybersquatting cause of action, thus avoiding the CDA’s 
immunity provision.264 Allowing such claims could flood the 
courts with baseless secondary liability claims and could become 
burdensome for social media sites as well. Congress should 
weaken the express exemption for intellectual property claims 
under Section 230(e) of the CDA because that section completely 
eliminates immunity for any intellectual property cause of 
action.265 While this discourages ISPs from ignoring trademark 
infringement, it also subjects ISPs to frivolous lawsuits. The 
alarming trend with Section 230(e) is that plaintiffs state a cause of 
action under the ACPA in order to avoid the immunity provision of 
CDA 230(c).266 Such an exemption allows plaintiffs like La Russa 
to state a cybersquatting claim when the claim is really predicated 
on defamatory status updates and profile content.267 By weakening 
this exemption, Congress could save the courts and social media 
websites from having to fend off frivolous lawsuits.   
B. Remedies for Social Media Policy 
The ACPA should not be the only remedy for this form of 
cybersquatting. Amending these websites’ policies would provide 
a less costly alternative to trademark owners.268 Administrators of 
social media websites should also play an active role in curtailing 
such infringement. By broadening the scope of the verification 
mechanisms available to corporations and by enforcing the 
verification policy more stringently, trademark owners would be 
able to pursue a viable alternative to the costly litigation associated 
                                                          
264 See Macmillan, supra note 24 (noting the distinction between trademark 
infringement and protections afforded ISPs under Section 230 in cases dealing 
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with the ACPA.269 Moreover, these administrators would serve as 
gatekeepers and weed out unnecessary and frivolous litigation. 
1. Verification Features 
Verification features are useful tools to proactively combat 
username infringement. Both Twitter and Facebook have such 
features, but both need to be amended in order to provide 
trademark owners with adequate protection.  Strengthening these 
features will allow Twitter’s and Facebook’s trademark policies to 
be proactive rather than retroactive. Twitter has become a haven 
for cybersquatters and therefore needs to amend its current 
verification policy. Twitter should extend its verification feature to 
include all corporations. Currently, the policy only applies to some 
large conglomerates, such as Target.270 Twitter is currently testing 
a verification policy for businesses, but the website is not 
accepting verification requests from all businesses yet.271 Under 
the current Twitter verification policy, users are free to pose as 
corporations and free ride off the good will of that corporation.272 
Evidence of reservation of famous brands as usernames suggests 
that this is exactly what is happening on Twitter.273 Permitting 
such free riding could lead to genericide of the mark, tarnishment 
of the owner’s reputation, and consumer confusion. Expansion of 
the verification tool to all corporations would help to curtail 
cybersquatting on Twitter because the verification badge allows 
users to discern the official profile for each corporation and its 
brand names.274 The verification tool would also cut consumer 
search costs because a user would able to spot a fake profile, even 
if they were misled by a deceptive hashtag.275 In doing so, this 
would also protect the consumer from fraud.  
Facebook’s policy may also need to be amended. Although 
                                                          
269 Id. 
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Facebook does have a verification feature, it appears to be a weak 
one. Currently, Facebook requires that an official representative 
reserve the username and the administrators verify such accounts 
via mobile authentication.276 Impostors could pose as official 
representatives and pose as the representative during “mobile 
authentication.”277 As a solution, the representative should be 
required to produce proof of ownership of the mark; a registration 
certificate, for example, would be sufficient proof here. The 
website should also require verification through a company email 
address. A more stringent implementation of the verification policy 
would help circumvent the problem and discourage impostors from 
trying to verify their profiles fraudulently.   
In addition, Facebook’s verification policy does little to avoid 
consumer confusion. Specifically, the verification278 feature does 
not feature a visual “badge” like Twitter’s verification feature.279 
By creating a badge for verified accounts, users would easily be 
able to discern fake profiles from real ones. Creating these badges 
would therefore reduce search costs and reduce the potential harms 
of username infringement. 
2. Reporting Procedures: A Method to Avoid Costly Litigation 
Trademark owners would be wise to work with the 
administrators of social media sites to shut down impostor profiles. 
Both Facebook and Twitter encourage trademark owners to report 
instances of name squatting.280 Both websites require the 
trademark owner to provide proof of ownership via a registration 
number.281 Since protection is predicated on registration of the 
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mark, the brand owner would be wise to register his mark or risk 
losing the benefits of the reporting mechanisms.282 Significantly, 
this process is relatively inexpensive in comparison to litigating 
against the mark owner.283 The mark owner would also get what he 
wants—the username would be transferred and the impostor 
profile will be shut down.284  
Moreover, the administrators would be able to weed out 
frivolous complaints, particularly where there is a free speech 
interest at stake. For example, if a username is “Nikesucks” or any 
other form of clear criticism, the administrators should dismiss any 
related complaints because this is clearly a form of criticism with 
the source as the target.285 Employing this strategy will create an 
alternative to costly litigation by working constructively with the 
administrators of social media websites.   
In some cases, specifically with unregistered marks, litigation 
might be inevitable.286 Site administrators might refuse to transfer 
or eliminate the infringing profile; in such a case, the plaintiff 
would be forced to appeal. In this event, litigation would be 
necessary to protect the mark owners’ interests.287 Consequently, 
the plaintiff should only litigate when the social media site 
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wrongly rejects his complaint and such litigation should be a last 
resort because it is expensive and time consuming. In sum, 
plaintiffs, and even defendants, should use litigation when there 
are no other alternatives available.   
CONCLUSION 
Cybersquatting on social media websites poses to trademark 
owners a real threat that must be addressed. Trademark owners 
should not immediately pursue a cause of action under the ACPA. 
Instead, trademark owners should work with these websites to 
protect their own interests. Trademark owners have a number of 
options at their disposal—they could: (1) ask the website to 
transfer the username, (2) ask the website to shut down the profile 
or hashtag, (3) contact the profile owner and ask him to transfer the 
username, or (4) verify the account.288 To create a viable option for 
creating an official page, web administrators need to create a 
strong verification policy to proactively combat name squatting. 
Doing so will prevent serious damage to a trademark. 
These policy problems are not confined to social media 
websites. The ACPA is an outdated statute, one which needs to be 
amended to adequately address the modern and complex issues 
associated with cybersquatting on social media websites. Congress 
should amend the bad faith provision, particularly its safe harbor 
provision. In addition, Congress needs to weaken the CDA’s 
exemption of intellectual property claims from its immunity 
provision to prevent frivolous litigation. It is crucial that such 
changes are made in order to prevent cybersquatters from getting a 
free ride from a mark and to protect the brand of mark owners on 
social media websites.  
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